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ABSTRACT
Trusted Computing Bases (TCBs) of today’s com-
modity systems have arbitrarily evolved for decades.
As a result, these TCBs are heterogeneous, large, dis-
tributed, and complex, and the resulting security ar-
chitectures inherit these properties. Non-surprisingly,
implementations are also large and complex, such
that correctness, robustness, and tamperproofness of a
TCB’s implementation are quite hard to verify.
In this proposal we present an approach that ex-
ploits causal dependencies between security policies
and TCB functions, in order to precisely deﬁne a TCB’s
functional range. The objective is to set the course for a
TCB’s implementation whose size allows for verifying
their correctness and tamperproofness.
Index Terms—Trusted Computing Bases, Security
Architectures, Security Policies, Security Models
1. INTRODUCTION
Security properties are not properties of privileged sys-
tems running in very security- and safety-critical areas
any more; instead almost any IT system features secu-
rity properties nowadays, and the correctness of a sys-
tem’s security properties is none the less crucial for the
functionality of that system. For example, a university
information system manages, among others, the exam-
ination marks of students for testimonializing. The
authenticity and integrity of students’ marks are criti-
cal for the system’s correct functionality; without au-
thenticity and integrity of students’ marks the required
functionality of testimonializing cannot be provided by
the system.
Already this small example shows, that security
properties are tailored to a system according to the sys-
tem’s security requirements. In order to develop secu-
rity properties, IT systems increasingly apply security
policies — strategies designed to meet the security re-
quirements of IT systems [1] — and Trusted Comput-
ing Bases (TCBs) are responsible for pursuing these
security strategies in IT systems. In doing so, TCBs
are exclusively in charge of establishing and preserving
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any security property of IT systems. For this reason, a
TCB’s correctness and tamperproofness are crucial cri-
teria for establishing, preserving and thus guaranteeing
a system’s security properties.
We consider a TCB to contain all functionalities
required to establish and preserve a system’s security
properties. More precisely, we deﬁne a TCB as those
system functionalities, and only those, which are neces-
sary and sufﬁcient to establish and preserve a system’s
security properties.
We differentiate between a TCB, its security ar-
chitecture, and the security architecture’s implementa-
tion. That part of a system architecture whose func-
tional properties are deﬁned by the system’s TCB, is
called the system’s security architecture. In contrast to
system architectures, there are speciﬁc non-functional
requirements for security architectures, e.g. the refer-
ence monitor principles [2, 3], which deﬁne particular
architectural patterns for security architectures. Data
types, functions, and algorithms within the implemen-
tation of a security architecture representing the TCB’s
functionalities are then referred to as the security archi-
tecture’s implementation which is composed of coop-
erating security mechanisms. Figure 1 shows the inter-
relations between a TCB, its security architecture and
security mechanisms.
Security
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Fig. 1. Interrelations of TCBs, Security Architectures,
and Security Mechanisms
2. MOTIVATION
The lower the complexity of a TCB and the smaller its
functional range, the easier it is to verify the correct-
ness and tamperproofness of a TCB’s implementation
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[3, 4, 5]. Designing a small TCB with low complexity
then sets the course for allowing its security architec-
ture to be strictly isolated from all security-insensitive
system components. This, in turn, provides a promis-
ing breeding ground for a small implementation with
low complexity and veriﬁable correctness and tamper-
proofness.
Considering today’s commodity systems, however,
we make the observation that their TCBs and security
architectures do not meet these design criteria. The
prime driver is that system designs are guided by seek-
ing generality, in order to be both useful and usable
[6]. This results in large and complex, general-purpose
systems providing a wide variety of security proper-
ties for many purposes. TCBs of such systems — in
the following referred to as evolved TCBs — have not
been engineered; instead they have arbitrarily evolved
for decades due to ever growing and changing secu-
rity requirements. This leads to a large, complex, and
chaotic design, and the resulting security architectures
inherit these properties. Consequently, implementa-
tions of these security architectures are also large and
complex with hundreds of thousands of lines of code;
and a positive correlation between software complexity
and coding errors is well known [7].
Moreover, it can be observed that more and more
applications conﬁde in their own security properties,
e.g. web browsers rely on a wide variety of security
plug-ins to prevent executing malicious code. The rea-
sons are twofold. On the one hand, the high proba-
bility of errors and faults results in a lack of trust in
the system’s security properties. On the other hand,
even though today’s systems provide numerous secu-
rity properties, they may be inadequate for applications
since they do not fulﬁll the applications’ security re-
quirements. Therefore, applications increasingly try to
establish security properties on their own, which are
then immanent parts of the applications since they are
implemented by application-speciﬁc software compo-
nents. It follows that security properties are not only
established and preserved by a system’s core compo-
nent — the operating system — but also by middle-
ware and application components. This leads to het-
erogeneous functional ranges of TCBs, and implemen-
tations of such TCBs are composed by many indepen-
dent and not always cooperating security mechanisms
resulting in that the same security properties are im-
plemented several times by several mechanisms. This
again results in even larger and more complex imple-
mentations.
These problems have been known for a long time
and are mainly caused by the arbitrary evolvement of
TCBs. However, research projects such as [8, 9, 10,
11, 12] show that it doesn’t have to be that way. These
projects aim at IT systems supporting a wide variety
of problem-speciﬁc security policies like operating sys-
tems that support a wide range of applications. The re-
sults are universal TCBs which allow for ﬂexibly inte-
grating problem-speciﬁc security policies that can now
be carefully engineered according to a system’s secu-
rity requirements. Whenever a system’s security re-
quirements change due to organizational or technical
reasons, e.g. by installing new application software, the
policy speciﬁcation can be reengineered and integrated
again in the TCB without having to adapt the TCB it-
self. The basis is a shift in the TCB design which is
now guided by seeking centralization of TCB compo-
nents. This leads to a new TCB component on the oper-
ating system level — the policy manager — and over-
all there are fewer and smaller TCB components on the
application level as well as smaller and less complex
TCB components on the operating system level. Nev-
ertheless, universal TCBs are still large, complex and
distributed over different system layers such that their
security architectures cannot be properly isolated from
security-insensitive system components which, in turn,
still inevitably leads to complex and large security ar-
chitectures whose correctness, robustness and tamper-
proofness are hard to verify.
3. CAUSAL TCBS
IT systems with advanced security requirements in-
creasingly apply security policies for describing, an-
alyzing and implementing security properties [13, 14,
15, 12]. In order to precisely describe security poli-
cies, formal security models such as [16, 17, 18, 19] are
applied, allowing for formal analyses of security prop-
erties and serving as speciﬁcations from which policy
implementations are generated [20]. Consequently, se-
curity policies specify the functional requirements of
TCBs.
Our objective is to set the course for verifying the
correctness and tamperproofness of a TCB’s imple-
mentation by establishing a small and functionally min-
imal implementation of a TCB. We are convinced, that
the essential prerequisite for such an implementation
is a functionally minimal security architecture which
again is based on a functionally minimal TCB. Our ap-
proach deals with the starting point of these dependen-
cies — the functional range of TCBs.
The proposed approach is based on causal depen-
dencies between a system’s security policies and TCB
functions. The objective is to design causally de-
termined TCBs containing those functions, and only
those, which are necessary and sufﬁcient to enforce and
protect the TCBs’ security policies. Hence, the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of causally determined TCBs
is that each TCB functionality is precisely motivated
by the system’s security policies (Figure 2). As a re-
sult, causal TCBs are functionally minimal regarding
the system’s security policies, and the TCB’s complex-
ity represents the security policies’ complexity.
Our position is that pursuing this approach does
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Fig. 2. Causal Dependencies
not lead to evolved or universal TCBs; instead re-
sulting TCBs are causal TCBs which are tailored to
and causally-driven by their security policies. Deriv-
ing a TCB’s functional range from security policies
based on causal dependencies results in both policy
runtime as well as policy protection support (policy in-
dependent), as well as policy-dependent functionality.
Therefore, causal TCBs are split into three functional-
ity parts: a TCB-kernel, TCB-modules, and security-
policy-modules (SP-modules) as shown in Figure 3.
The TCB-kernel provides the runtime system for secu-
rity policies and contains those, and only those func-
tions, which are required by all security policies in
equal measure (kernel functionality). TCB-modules
consist of those, and only those functions, which are
required by all security policies to protect and encap-
sulate them (module functionality). SP-modules are
policy-speciﬁc and contain those, and only those func-
tions, which are required by problem-speciﬁc security
policy components (policy-speciﬁc SP functionality).
Fig. 3. TCB Design
Security policies are not static; instead whenever
security requirements of IT systems change due to tech-
nical or organizational reasons, the system’s security
policies may have to be adapted. In today’s commod-
ity systems organizational reasons are alterations of a
company’s policy, e.g. because of new business areas,
projects, jurisdictions, or mergers. Technical reasons
are modiﬁcations of systems, e.g. by installing, remov-
ing, or updating application software. These examples
show, that security requirements of today’s commodity
systems can change both rarely, e.g. in case of merger,
as well as frequently, e.g. by doing software updates at
regular intervals. This situation will be intensiﬁed since
systems are moving from today’s standalone to ser-
vice oriented systems allowing for spontaneous com-
munication and interaction. Future systems are very
dynamic applications and security requirements will
change spontaneously much more often. Because of
this combination of ﬂexibility and dynamics along with
the growing demand for security, systems also need to
provide concepts that are able to manage the increasing
dynamics of security policies.
Security policy dynamics as well as functional min-
imality of causal TCBs regarding a system’s security
policies result in the need of causal TCBs to be able
to ﬂexibly adapt to security policy dynamics and thus
become dynamic. Our objective is to equip causal
TCBs with functional scalability properties such that
dynamics of security properties is reﬂected in TCBs’
dynamics. Prerequisites are rules which precisely de-
ﬁne security policy components and their interrela-
tions. Based on these rules, scalability properties then
specify whether new functions (derived from causal
dependencies) have to added to or removed from a
TCB, and which interrelations between TCB functions
emerge/drop when adding/removing functions.
Since the TCB-kernel provides a runtime system
for any security policy and particularly does not con-
tain any other functionality that is not necessary and
sufﬁcient for a security policy runtime system, alter-
ations of a system’s security policies do not have any
impact on the kernel functions but only on the mod-
ule and SP functionality. We consider TCB-modules
and SP-modules to be sets of TCB functions. Thus, set
characteristics hold and a set is scalable with respect to
the number of its elements by deﬁnition — an element
is added to or removed from a set using set operators
and prohibiting element redundancies. Consequently,
module and SP functionality can only be added if they
are not already contained by either TCB-modules or
a speciﬁc SP-module. However, since the functional-
ity is implied by the TCB’s security policies, removing
module and SP functionality due to removal of secu-
rity policies is critical and may result in functionality
gaps — if a function which is required by more than
one security policy is removed from a TCB-module,
there will be a lack of functions for the remaining secu-
rity policies of this TCB-module. Functionally scalable
TCBs deal with that.
If at all times the TCB-modules and the SP-
modules contain exactly those functions implied by the
integrated security policies, i.e. each of these and no
other functions, then we call a causal TCB functionally
scalable.
On the one hand, a TCB’s functional scalability is
similar to a set’s scalability by avoiding functional re-
dundancy. On the other hand, functional scalability is
beyond a set’s scalability, since the TCB’s functions are
based on causal dependencies of security policies. The
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additional value becomes apparent when removing se-
curity policies from a TCB. In that case, characteristics
of set operators are no longer met, because the relevant
TCB functions may only be removed if they are not
implied by other security policies that are not removed.
This means, that TCB functions might not be removed
even if security policies implying them are extracted.
Consequently, a causal and functionally scalable TCB
contains at all times exactly all functions implied by the
integrated security policies.
Concluding, the approach of causal and function-
ally scalable TCBs promises a new quality of TCBs
whose functions are precisely deﬁned by their security
policies and which are able to ﬂexibly adapt to secu-
rity policy dynamics. Consequently, at all times these
TCBs are functionally minimal regarding the system’s
security policies, and the TCB’s complexity represents
the security policies’ complexity. This sets the course
for precise arguments about a TCB’s size and complex-
ity. In turn, this leads to security architectures whose
complexity and size comply with the properties of their
security policies. The consequence is that for many
practical systems the complexity and size of their se-
curity architectures can be signiﬁcantly reduced. The
proposed approach thus sets the course for reducing the
number of coding errors and verifying the correctness
and tamperproofness of a TCB’s implementation.
4. CHALLENGES AND IDEAS
The challenges of this approach can be classiﬁed along
two questions.
1. How to identify causal dependencies between se-
curity policies and TCB functions?
2. How to design functional scalability?
However, answers to these questions are not au-
tonomous; in fact, some of the challenges pose similar
problems which have to be considered from different
points of view and whose solutions have to be properly
combined. The challenges raised by both questions as
well as ideas to approach them are discussed below.
4.1. Identifying Causal Dependencies
Challenges Causal dependencies deﬁne a mapping
from security policies to those TCB functions required
to enforce and protect these security policies. In or-
der to identify this security-policies-to-TCB-functions
mapping, precise necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
are needed. Thus, the challenge is to ﬁnd these condi-
tions that control the mapping. Security policies are too
informal, in order to derive precise causal dependen-
cies, or to analyze security properties. The latter was
solved by applying formal security models which not
only allowed for analyzing security properties but also
for generating policy implementations. The challenge
is now, to apply formal security models to our approach
in order to identify causal dependencies between secu-
rity policies and TCB functions. The objective is to de-
rive TCB functionality which can be assigned either to
the TCB-kernel, the TCB-modules, or the SP-modules
(Figure 4).
TCB-modules
Functionality
SP-modules
Functionality
TCB-kernel
Functionality
Security
Model
Security
Policy
Modeling
Causal
Dependencies
Fig. 4. Deriving TCB Functionality from Security Poli-
cies and Security Models
Ideas For precisely identifying these causal depen-
dencies, we refer to formal security models of secu-
rity policies since any well-engineered security policy
comes with a precise and formal security model, e.g.
different kind of access control polices can be mod-
eled with [16, 21, 19, 22], multi-level security poli-
cies are based on the Denning model [23], and non-
interference security policies are modeled with [17].
Remarkably, all of the aforementioned security mod-
els reveal a common, formal model foundation for
which rewriting rules can be deﬁned that map the stan-
dard model calculi onto the uniform model foundation.
This model foundation serves as a uniform basis for
all security models. It consists of model components
which are required by all security policies (called core
model). Additionally, the model foundation is exten-
sible by policy-speciﬁc model components in order to
model problem-speciﬁc parts of the security policies
(called model extensions). Consequently, various kinds
of security policies can be modeled with the model
foundation and this sets the preconditions for identify-
ing causal dependencies between security policies and
TCBs.
4.2. Designing Functional Scalability
Challenges In order to map security policy dynam-
ics onto TCB functions, we need to identify interrela-
tions between security policies and their components.
Thus, the challenge is to deﬁne rules that precisely de-
scribe these interrelations. For this purpose, a main
requirement is to express security policies and their
components in such terms that any interrelation be-
comes explicit. Doing so, raises the following ques-
tions: Which interrelations between security policies
do exist and how to describe them? Do security policy
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interrelations impose additional functions on a TCB’s
functional range?
Ideas Since the formal and uniform model founda-
tion introduced in Section 4.1 allows for modeling var-
ious kinds of security policies, we also refer to this
model foundation in order to identify security pol-
icy interrelations. Already modeling the security poli-
cies mentioned above shows, that security policy blood
lines exist, allowing us to deﬁne rules that precisely de-
scribe security policy interrelationships in such a way
that whenever a security policy interrelationship exists,
there is a security policy lineage. In doing so, we have
to clarify whether security policies have to meet any
prerequisites in order to belong to the evolution hier-
archy, and what the root element of the security policy
blood line is.
5. CONCLUSION
This approach leads to establishing causal dependen-
cies between security policies and TCB functions. The
result is a precise reasoning drawn from a system’s se-
curity policies about the functions of a system’s TCB.
These causal TCBs are functionally minimal regarding
the system’s security policies, and the TCB’s complex-
ity represents the security policies’ complexity.
Functional minimality of causal TCBs regarding a
system’s security policies, as well as security policy dy-
namics results in the need of causal TCBs to become
able to ﬂexibly adapt to security policy dynamics. This
leads to equipping causal TCBs with functional scala-
bility properties such that dynamics of security proper-
ties is reﬂected in TCBs’ dynamics.
Modeling causal TCBs within a security architec-
ture then results in security architecture whose com-
plexity and size comply with the properties of their se-
curity policies. The bottom line is, that we establish a
promising breeding ground for analyzing the correct-
ness, and tamperproofness of TCBs.
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